

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

SHARON QUILL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,  
Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:13-CV-3097-JTR

ORDER GRANTING  
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR  
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BEFORE THE COURT are cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 18, 19. Attorney D. James Tree represents Plaintiff, and Special Assistant United States Attorney Nicole A. Jabaily represents the Commissioner of Social Security (Defendant). The parties have consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. ECF No. 8. After reviewing the administrative record and the briefs filed by the parties, the court **GRANTS** Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and **DENIES** Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

**JURISDICTION**

On June 3, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Title II and a Title XVI application for disability and supplemental security income benefits, alleging disability beginning October 1, 1989. Tr. 25; 263-64. Plaintiff reported that she was unable to work due to manic depression and PTSD. Tr. 268. Plaintiff's claim was denied initially and on reconsideration, and she requested a hearing before an administrative law

<sup>1</sup> judge (ALJ). Tr. 102-192.

2 On February 15, 2011, ALJ Marie Palachuk held a hearing, at which medical  
3 expert Donna Mary Veraldi, Ph.D., vocational expert K. Diane Kramer and  
4 Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified. Tr. 59-100. On March 25,  
5 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 25-41. The  
6 Appeals Council declined review. Tr. 1-4. The instant matter is before this court  
7 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

## STATEMENT OF FACTS

9       The facts have been presented in the administrative hearing transcript, the  
10 ALJ's decision, and the briefs of the parties and, thus, they are only briefly  
11 summarized here. At the time of the third hearing, Plaintiff was 40 years old, and  
12 had one teenage daughter. Tr. 102; 308-09. As of September, 2008, Plaintiff was  
13 living with relatives. Tr. 308.

14 Plaintiff completed the ninth grade of school, and later obtained a GED. Tr.  
15 76. She worked at several short-term jobs, often as a cashier, at stores such as  
16 Wal-Mart and at Michael's Arts and Crafts. Tr. 78; 254-59. She also worked as a  
17 waitress and as a produce sorter. Tr. 254-59. She obtained a cosmetology license  
18 and worked as a hairdresser for a few months. Tr. 79.

19 Plaintiff testified that she did not take street drugs, after her teen years. Tr.  
20 89. But in October 2008, she told Jay M. Toews, Ph.D., that she has a “long  
21 history” of substance abuse. Tr. 459. Plaintiff also testified that at one time, she  
22 lied and claimed that she was using methamphetamine, so she could go to a  
23 rehabilitation facility and get away from her mother. Tr. 89.

Plaintiff testified that she has had back problems since she was a teenager, and she experiences increased pain when she is under stress. Tr. 92. She described her daily routine as watching television, eating, and sometimes staying in bed all day. Tr. 308. Plaintiff indicated that she eats frozen meals, and she can perform “all chores,” but if she is too depressed she will not do anything. Tr. 310.

1 She reported her hobbies as sewing, beading, walking, watching television and  
 2 reading. Tr. 312.

### 3 STANDARD OF REVIEW

4 The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in  
 5 medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities. *Andrews v. Shalala*, 53 F.3d 1035,  
 6 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ's determinations of law are reviewed *de novo*, with  
 7 deference to a reasonable construction of the applicable statutes. *McNatt v. Apfel*,  
 8 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed  
 9 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error.  
 10 *Tackett v. Apfel*, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is  
 11 defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. *Id.* at  
 12 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a  
 13 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. *Richardson v.*  
 14 *Perales*, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one  
 15 rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the  
 16 ALJ. *Tackett*, 180 F.3d at 1097; *Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin.*,  
 17 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, a decision supported by  
 18 substantial evidence will still be set aside if the proper legal standards were not  
 19 applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. *Brawner v. Secretary*  
 20 *of Health and Human Services*, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). If substantial  
 21 evidence exists to support the administrative findings, or if conflicting evidence  
 22 exists that will support a finding of either disability or non-disability, the ALJ's  
 23 determination is conclusive. *Sprague v. Bowen*, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (9th  
 24 Cir. 1987).

### 25 SEQUENTIAL PROCESS

26 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process  
 27 for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a),  
 28 416.920(a); see *Bowen v. Yuckert*, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). In steps one

1 through four, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a *prima facie*  
2 case of entitlement to disability benefits. *Tackett*, 180 F.3d at 1098-99. This  
3 burden is met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment  
4 prevents him from engaging in his previous occupation. 20 C.F.R. §§  
5 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If a claimant cannot do his past relevant work, the  
6 ALJ proceeds to step five, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that  
7 (1) the claimant can make an adjustment to other work; and (2) specific jobs exist  
8 in the national economy which claimant can perform. *Batson v. Commissioner of*  
9 *Social Sec. Admin.*, 359 F.3d 1190, 1193-94 (2004). If a claimant cannot make an  
10 adjustment to other work in the national economy, a finding of “disabled” is made.  
11 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I-v), 416.920(a)(4)(I-v).

12 If the individual succeeds in proving disability when there is evidence of  
13 drug and alcohol addiction (DAA), the Commissioner must then determine  
14 whether the DAA is material to the determination of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§  
15 404.1535 and 416.935. The ALJ must determine whether the claimant would be  
16 disabled if he or she stopped using alcohol or drugs. The Social Security Act bars  
17 payment of benefits when drug addiction and/or alcoholism is a contributing factor  
18 material to a disability claim. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(C) and 1382(a)(3)(J); *Sousa*  
19 v. *Callahan*, 143 F. 3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has the burden of  
20 showing that drug and alcohol addiction (DAA) is not a contributing factor  
21 material to disability. *Ball v. Massanari*, 254 F. 3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001).

22 If evidence exists of DAA and the individual succeeds in proving disability,  
23 the Commissioner must determine whether the DAA is material to the  
24 determination of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535 and 416.935. If an ALJ finds  
25 that the claimant is not disabled, then the claimant is not entitled to benefits and  
26 there is no need to proceed with the analysis to determine whether substance abuse  
27 is a contributing factor material to disability. However, if the ALJ finds that the  
28 claimant is disabled, then the ALJ must proceed to determine if the claimant would

1 be disabled if he or she stopped using alcohol or drugs.

2                   **ALJ'S FINDINGS**

3                   At step one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Plaintiff has  
4 not engaged in substantial gainful activity October 1, 1989, her application date.  
5 Tr. 28. At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments  
6 of major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and polysubstance (cocaine,  
7 methamphetamine, and alcohol) abuse disorder. Tr. 28. At step three, the ALJ  
8 found Plaintiff's impairments, including the substance abuse disorders, medically  
9 equal sections 12.04, 12.06 and 12.09 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix  
10 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d)). Tr. 34. The ALJ also found that if  
11 Plaintiff stopped the substance abuse, the remaining limitations would cause more  
12 than a minimal impact on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities;  
13 therefore the claimant would continue to have a severe impairment or combination  
14 of impairments. Tr. 34. The ALJ concluded that if the "claimant stopped the  
15 substance use, the claimant would not have an impairment or combination of  
16 impairments that meets or medically equals any of the impairments listed in of 20  
17 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d))."  
18 Tr. 35.

19                  The ALJ next found that if Plaintiff stopped the substance use, she would  
20 have the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all  
21 exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations:

22                  She is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple routine and  
23 repetitive tasks involving up to 3-step commands. She should have  
24 minimal contact with the public and only occasional superficial  
25 interactions with coworkers and supervisors. It would be best if the  
26 claimant dealt with things rather than people; therefore, a more  
27 isolated work environment would be appropriate. She would need  
28 additional time to adapt to changes in the work routine or work  
setting, and there may be occasions where she may need an additional  
5 or 10 minute break during the workday.

1 Tr. 36. The ALJ also found that if Plaintiff stopped the substance use, she would  
2 be able to perform past relevant work as a sorter. Tr. 40. The ALJ concluded that  
3 because Plaintiff would not be disabled if she stopped the substance use, her  
4 substance use disorder is a contributing factor material to the determination of  
5 disability, and thus she is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security  
6 Act. Tr. 40.

## 7 ISSUES

8 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by: (1) finding Plaintiff had little  
9 credibility; (2) weighing the medical evidence; (3) positing an incomplete  
10 hypothetical to the vocational expert; and (4) failing to follow the requirements of  
11 SSR 13-2p. ECF No. 18 at 9-10.

### 12 1. Credibility

13 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting Plaintiff's  
14 credibility on the basis that the medical record did not adequately support her  
15 subjective statements. ECF No. 18 at 14-15.

16 The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility. *Andrews*, 53 F.3d at  
17 1039. Unless affirmative evidence exists indicating that the claimant is  
18 malingering, the ALJ's reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony must be "clear  
19 and convincing." *Lester v. Chater*, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ's  
20 findings must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. *Rashad v. Sullivan*, 903  
21 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). "General findings are insufficient; rather, the  
22 ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines  
23 the claimant's complaints." *Reddick v. Chater*, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998),  
24 quoting *Lester*, 81 F.3d at 834.

25 The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not credible, based upon a lack of objective  
26 medical evidence to support the severity of her claimed symptoms, her inconsistent  
27 statements about substance abuse, and her sporadic work history prior to the  
28 alleged onset of her disabling conditions. Tr. 38. Plaintiff does not challenge the

1 ALJ's findings regarding inconsistent statements and her sporadic work history  
 2 prior to her alleged onset date. Instead, Plaintiff argues that medical evidence  
 3 supports Plaintiff's claims, and specifically argues that medical records from Mr.  
 4 Whiteshirt and Dr. Thompson support her credibility. ECF No. 18 at 14.  
 5 Plaintiff's argument is cursory, and contains few citations to the record. ECF No.  
 6 18 at 14-15.<sup>1</sup>

7 Upon review of the record, Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ erred in  
 8 determining Plaintiff lacked credibility is not persuasive. First, Plaintiff fails to  
 9 specify the alleged records from "Whiteshirt, M.S.W." that support her argument.  
 10 ECF No. 18 at 14. Nila Whiteshirt, M.S.W., completed multiple "WorkFirst  
 11 Participation Verification Form[s]" indicating that Plaintiff attended, or failed to  
 12 attend, workshops between April 2008 and January 2009. Tr. 644-59. However,  
 13 Plaintiff failed to specify which opinions support her credibility. Also lacking is  
 14 analysis related to records authored by Ms. Whiteshirt that provide objective  
 15 medical evidence to support Plaintiff's claims of severe symptoms. The Ninth  
 16 Circuit has repeatedly admonished that the court will not "manufacture arguments  
 17 for an appellant and, therefore, will not consider claims that were not actually  
 18 argued in appellant's opening brief." *Greenwood v. Fed. Aviation Admin.*, 28 F.3d  
 19 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994). Because Plaintiff failed to provide meaningful analysis  
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21 <sup>1</sup>Plaintiff's argument also is devoid of relevant standards for determining  
 22 credibility under the regulations, and instead cites to *Corpus Juris Secundum*,  
 23 while urging the court to review the record regarding Plaintiff's credibility in "the  
 24 light most favorable to the Claimant." ECF No. 18 at 15-16. We decline  
 25 Plaintiff's invitation to employ a novel standard of review, and instead the court  
 26 adheres to Ninth Circuit precedent that prohibits second-guessing of the ALJ  
 27 credibility determination when the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial  
 28 evidence. *Thomas v. Barnhart*, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002).

1 and argument, the court is unable to review this portion of Plaintiff's issue.<sup>2</sup>

2       The second prong of Plaintiff's argument relies upon a record she  
3 erroneously attributes to "Thompson, M.D.," which is a brief questionnaire  
4 completed by Thomas S. Walker, M.D. Tr. 517. The form, dated July 9, 2009,  
5 reveals that Plaintiff was a new patient, and she was first seen by this doctor less  
6 than four weeks earlier on June 12, 2009. Tr. 517-18. Dr. Walker indicated he had  
7 seen Plaintiff twice, for abdominal pain related to gallstones. Tr. 517. In response  
8 to the question, "does your patient have to lie down during the day?" Dr. Walker  
9 responded "yes." Tr. 517. Dr. Walker answered that full time work would likely  
10 cause Plaintiff's pain and depression to increase, yet Plaintiff was not likely to  
11 miss work due to medical impairments. Tr. 518.

12       Dr. Walker's brief answers on a single form do not provide objective  
13 medical evidence that supports Plaintiff's assertions of the alleged severity of her  
14 symptoms. In the corresponding chart notes, Dr. Walker acknowledged that since  
15 he had only seen Plaintiff twice for her abdominal pain which were gallstones, he  
16 was "only able to provide limited info[rmation] for her long standing back pain."  
17 Tr. 538. As such, Dr. Walker's cursory answers on the July 9, 2009, form do not  
18 provide objective medical evidence that supports Plaintiff's credibility.

19       Moreover, the ALJ provided valid reasons for finding Plaintiff's credibility  
20 lacking. Specifically, the ALJ relied upon the lack of objective medical evidence,  
21 Plaintiff's inconsistent statements about her substance abuse, and her sporadic  
22 work history prior to the alleged onset of her disabling conditions. Tr. 38; *see*  
23 *Morgan*, 169 F.3d at 600 (conflicts between a Plaintiff's testimony of subjective

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25       <sup>2</sup>The ALJ gave little weight to Ms. Whiteshirt's opinion that Plaintiff was  
26 unable to work more than ten hours per week because that assessment was  
27 "admittedly based on the claimant's self-statements." Tr. 39. The record supports  
28 this finding. Tr. 652.

1 complaints and the objective medical evidence in the record can constitute specific  
 2 and substantial reasons that undermine credibility); *Thomas*, 278 F.3d at 959 (in  
 3 finding claimant had little credibility, ALJ relied on claimant's inconsistent  
 4 statements regarding drug and alcohol use and spotty work history prior to onset  
 5 date); *Pearsall v. Massanari*, 274 F.3d 1211, 1218 (8th Cir. 2001) ("A lack of  
 6 work history may indicate a lack of motivation instead of a lack of ability").

7 Moreover, the ALJ's valid reasons are supported by substantial evidence.  
 8 For example, the evidence reveals that Plaintiff admitted she lied to her counselor  
 9 in order to get admitted to a rehabilitation facility. Tr. 89. She also gave  
 10 inconsistent answers about her abuse of drugs and alcohol. Tr. 459-60; 555.  
 11 Several objective medical tests of Plaintiff's back revealed normal anatomy, and  
 12 she exhibited normal gait, strength and sensation. Tr. 486, 520, 524, 718. Also,  
 13 the record establishes that Plaintiff's work history was sporadic, prior to her onset  
 14 date. Tr. 254-58; 275.

15 The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial  
 16 evidence, in determining that Plaintiff's complaints had little credibility.

## 17 **2. Medical Evidence**

18 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by "dismissing the numerous 'moderate'"  
 19 functional limitations of the Claimant." ECF No. 18 at 16-17. Plaintiff states that  
 20 Patricia Kraft, Ph.D., and non-examining medical expert Donna Veraldi, Ph.D.,  
 21 both assessed Plaintiff with several moderate functional limitations, and the ALJ  
 22 erred by "dismissing" these assessments.

23 Again, Plaintiff's vague statement of the issue lacks meaningful argument.  
 24 Plaintiff provides little more than a recitation of the number of moderate  
 25 limitations assessed by two medical providers and the definition of "moderate" as  
 26 it relates to the assessed impairments. In other words, Plaintiff fails to provide a  
 27 basic legal analysis.

28 On review, a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment was

1 completed on November 5, 2008, by Patricia Kraft, Ph.D. Tr. 478-80. Dr. Kraft  
2 assessed Plaintiff with six moderate limitations in the ability to: (1) understand and  
3 remember detailed instructions; (2) carry out detailed instructions; (3) maintain  
4 attention and concentration for extended periods; (4) work in coordination with or  
5 proximity to others without being distracted by them; (5) interact appropriately  
6 with the general public; and (6) accept instructions and respond appropriately to  
7 criticism from supervisors. Tr. 477-78.

8 Dr. Kraft's assessed moderate limitations are incorporated into Plaintiff's  
9 RFC. Compare, Tr. 478-80 and Tr. 36. For example, Dr. Kraft indicated that  
10 Plaintiff would be moderately limited in understanding, remembering and carrying  
11 out detailed instructions, and the RFC provides that Plaintiff is limited to simple,  
12 routine and repetitive tasks. Tr. 478; 36. Similarly, Dr. Kraft opined that Plaintiff  
13 would be moderately limited in working near others, interacting with the public  
14 and supervisors, and the RFC limits Plaintiff to jobs that have little to no contact  
15 with coworkers and the public, is more isolated, and requires working with things,  
16 not people. Tr. 478-80; 36. Plaintiff fails to identify a moderate limitation  
17 assessed by Dr. Kraft that was not incorporated into Plaintiff's RFC. The court  
18 finds none.

19 Similarly, the RFC incorporated Dr. Veraldi's assessed limitations. During  
20 the hearing, Donna Veraldi, Ph.D., opined that if Plaintiff stopped substance abuse  
21 and consistently took medications and was treated, she would experience only  
22 moderate functional limitations. Tr. 70-72. The ALJ synthesized Dr. Veraldi's  
23 assessed limitations in a narrative form:

24  
25 Q. Okay. So, if I were to place those limitations in a narrative  
26 form; trying to cover all the areas that you indicated had moderate  
27 limitations. If I were to indicate that she would be able to understand,  
28 remember and follow simple, routine, repetitive type tasks involving  
up to three step commands that she would – have minimal contact  
with the general public and only superficial occasional contact with

1 coworkers and supervisors?

2 A. I believe so.

3 Q. That she would be best dealing with things rather than people?

4 A. I believe so.

5 Q. That she should be provided additional time to adapt to any  
6 changes in the work routine or work setting.

7 A. I think that'd be [inaudible].

8 Q. And that she may upon occasion need an additional break in the  
9 work day over and above the regular two breaks that people get every  
10 day.

11 A. That to be [inaudible], yes.

12 Q. Are there any other limitations along those lines that you could  
13 think of that might be appropriate?

14 A. I don't think so.

15 Tr. 72-73. The ALJ incorporated the limitations, as opined by Dr. Veraldi, into  
16 Plaintiff's RFC:

17 If the claimant stopped substance use, the claimant would have  
18 the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all  
19 exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: She  
20 is able to understand, remember, and carry out simple routine and  
21 repetitive tasks involving up to 3-step commands. She should have  
22 minimal contact with the public and only occasional superficial  
23 interactions with coworkers and supervisors. It would be best if the  
24 claimant dealt with things rather than people; therefore, a more  
25 isolated work environment would be appropriate. She would need  
26 additional time to adapt to changes in the work routine or work  
27 setting, and there may be occasions where she may need an additional  
28 5 or 10 minute break during the workday.

1 Tr. 36.

2 Because the ALJ incorporated the moderate limitations as opined by Dr.  
 3 Kraft and Dr. Veraldi into Plaintiff's RFC, the Plaintiff failed to establish error.

4 **3. Hypothetical**

5 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to incorporate all of the  
 6 limitations opined by Dr. Veraldi into the hypothetical posed to the vocational  
 7 expert. ECF No. 18 at 10-13.

8 The hypothetical that ultimately served as the basis for the ALJ's  
 9 determination, i.e., the hypothetical that is predicated on the ALJ's final RFC  
 10 assessment, must account for all of the limitations and restrictions of the particular  
 11 claimant. *Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir.  
 12 2009). "If an ALJ's hypothetical does not reflect all of the claimant's limitations,  
 13 then the expert's testimony has no evidentiary value to support a finding that the  
 14 claimant can perform jobs in the national economy." *Id.* However, the ALJ "is  
 15 free to accept or reject restrictions in a hypothetical question that are not supported  
 16 by substantial evidence." *Greger v. Barnhart*, 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2006).

17 An ALJ may synthesize and translate assessed limitations into an RFC  
 18 assessment (and subsequently into a hypothetical to the vocational expert) without  
 19 repeating each functional limitation verbatim in the RFC assessment or  
 20 hypothetical.<sup>3</sup> *Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue*, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008)  
 21 (holding that an ALJ's RFC assessment that a claimant could perform simple tasks  
 22 adequately captured restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace,  
 23 because the assessment was consistent with the medical evidence).

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24

25 <sup>3</sup>The law contradicts Plaintiff's assertion: "This is why it is so important to  
 26 present hypotheticals word for word from the medical expert and not get caught up  
 27 in making up your own interpretations or demanding counsel to make up new  
 28 interpretations so that they are 'vocationally relevant.'" ECF No. 20 at 4.

1 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to incorporate into the hypothetical  
2 Plaintiff's requirement of extra breaks as opined by Dr. Veraldi. ECF No. 18 at 11.  
3 During the hearing, Dr. Veraldi assessed Plaintiff with several "moderate"  
4 limitations. Tr. 71-72. The ALJ synthesized the limitations and in relevant part,  
5 articulated one of the limitations as: "And that she may on occasion need an  
6 additional break in the work day over and above the regular two breaks that people  
7 get every day." Tr. 73. Dr. Veraldi affirmed that summary. Tr. 73.

8 Next, the ALJ posed several questions to the vocational expert, Diane  
9 Kramer, to determine if Plaintiff could perform her prior work. In particular, the  
10 ALJ asked Ms. Kramer to assume a hypothetical worker that included the  
11 limitations:

12 Q. ... Additional time would be needed to adapt to changes in the  
13 work routine or work setting, and there may be occasions where the  
14 individual would need an additional break during the day to just kind  
of get away from the work setting. ....  
15

16 A. Where I'm stumped is trying to sort out the last two additional  
17 time to adapt to changes, and then break over and above the normal  
18 breaks. I feel that she could do the position of sorter. That would fall  
within all the rest of the hypothetical. Additional time to – really, it's  
the same thing over and over again, so they really don't – that  
wouldn't fall into consideration.  
20

21 Q. But, what you're saying, because you didn't finish your  
22 sentence. You're referring to the additional time to adapt to change  
stipulation?  
23

24 A. Yes.  
25

Q. Okay.  
26

A. I'm sorry. So that wouldn't be an issue, but the issue of  
additional break; the – wow. If the individual could use that break as  
on a lunch time, that could be factored in. I don't know if, you know,  
28

1 it might come down to specific accommodations. What I'm thinking  
2 about, if an individual worked on a sorting line and they got their two  
3 breaks; mid-morning and midafternoon instead of taking say like for  
4 example, a ten minute break, if they took a five minute break and then  
5 we're able to factor that in throughout another time; that might be  
accommodated. If, you know, that was worked out with the line  
supervisors. So, I'm having a hard time.

6 Q. So, if they had, let's say, one day during the week where they  
7 just felt like a need to get away, and asked can I go to the bathroom  
8 for five minutes; would that be some sort of a special accommodation  
9 that would need to be accommodated?

10 A. Not really. I've seen that happen. No, not really. I've seen that  
11 happen and I've experienced that.

12 Q. Okay. That's the type [of] thing I am referring to. If they just  
13 felt like they needed –

14 ...

15 [examination of vocational expert by claimant's attorney]

16 Q. ... if the break could be something like a lunchtime, or  
17 somebody could excuse themselves [sic] to a bathroom break; so you  
18 said just on a once a week basis, then it could be accommodated fine?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. And then, Ms. Kramer, this was something that was  
21 more than just like a once a week thing, but irregular times; could  
22 happen at any time. Would that be something that an individual could  
23 maintain competitive employment?

24 A. Well. I would think after a while that no, that an individual  
25 would be written up for taking too many breaks, and most likely it  
26 would lead to termination.

27 Tr. 96-99. Plaintiff charges that the ALJ "distorts the testimony of ME Veraldi,  
28

1 whose testimony implies that those additional breaks for [Plaintiff] were not  
 2 merely a possibility, but a probability," and "those additional breaks, taken on a  
 3 daily basis," meant Plaintiff could not sustain employment. ECF No. 18 at 12.  
 4 Plaintiff provides no citation to the record to support this charge. Upon review, the  
 5 court arrives at the opposite conclusion.

6 Dr. Veraldi agreed with the ALJ's summary of the limitation "And that she  
 7 ***may upon occasion*** need an additional break in the work day." Tr. 73 (emphasis  
 8 added). Plaintiff's attempt to equate the equivocal "may," qualifier with the  
 9 inevitable "will," is simply not supported by the record. Equally doomed is  
 10 Plaintiff's attempt to equate the sporadic possibility of "upon occasion," with the  
 11 consistent routine of "daily." Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, Dr. Veraldi did  
 12 not opine that Plaintiff would require daily, additional breaks from work. Thus,  
 13 the hypothetical was sufficient, and Plaintiff's argument fails.

#### 14 **4. SSR 13-2p**

15 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to follow SSR 13-2p. ECF No.  
 16 18 at 17. Social Security Rulings ("SSR") do not have the force of law.  
 17 Nevertheless, they "constitute Social Security Administration interpretations of the  
 18 statute it administers and of its own regulations," and are given deference "unless  
 19 they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the Act or regulations." *Han v.*  
 20 *Bowen*, 882 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1989).

21 In this case, as the Defendant points out, SSR 13-2p became effective March  
 22, 2013, and, thus was not available for the ALJ to consult in 2011. 78 Fed. Reg.  
 23 11939 (2013). As a result, Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ committed reversible  
 24 error by failing to follow SSR 13-2p fails.

25 Moreover, Plaintiff misunderstands the process set forth in SSR 13-2p.  
 26 Plaintiff argues that because the record does not clearly delineate a period of  
 27 abstinence from drugs and alcohol, the ALJ erred by "simply assum[ing] that if  
 28 Plaintiff stopped all substance abuse, she would be able to work." ECF No. 18 at

1 19-20.

2 Plaintiff has the burden of proving disability throughout the sequential  
 3 evaluation process and establishing a period of abstinence is not necessary:

4 it is our longstanding policy that the claimant continues to have the  
 5 burden of proving disability throughout the DAA materiality analysis.  
 6 There does not have to be evidence from a period of abstinence for the  
 7 claimant to meet his or her burden of proving disability.

8 SSR 13-2p at 5. Additionally, the determination of materiality – that is, whether  
 9 Plaintiff's use of drugs and alcohol materially contributes to her alleged disability -  
 10 - is an issue specially reserved to the Commissioner. SSR 13-2p at n.19. As such,  
 11 Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ incorrectly analyzed the DAA determination  
 12 because no evidence exists of a period of abstinence is not well taken. This issue  
 13 fails.

14 **CONCLUSION**

15 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ's conclusions, this court finds that  
 16 the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.  
 17 Accordingly,

18 **IT IS ORDERED:**

- 19 1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, **ECF No. 19**, is  
 20 **GRANTED.**  
 21 2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, **ECF No. 18**, is **DENIED**.  
 22 The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order, provide copies to  
 23 the parties, enter judgment in favor of Defendant, and **CLOSE** this file.

24 DATED July 22, 2014.



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M" followed by "T. RODGERS".

25  
 26 JOHN T. RODGERS  
 27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
 28